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Introduction
The small-and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing system in Korea, which has as a standpoint the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), is a world-class example of a set of long-term policies and actions devoted to creating growth and development. Some of the experiences and lessons learned over time in the evolution of this system will be used to derive recommendations for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries. The intention is to find the main lessons for productivity growth through SMEs' access to financial services, with a pivotal role played by development banks.
Section 1 of this document provides a brief history about Korea's rapid economic growth and the factors that lie beneath it. Section 2 examines the evolution and role of SMEs in Korea's rapid economic development process. Section 3 describes the financial support system designed by the Korean government to support SME growth. Section 4 describes IBK Programs, particularly in terms of productive development financing and value chain financing. Sections 5 and 6 provide conclusions and lessons to be drawn from Korean experiences in SME financing that can be applied in LAC countries.
Korea's Economic Growth

"Miracle on the Han River": Korea's Substantial Economic Growth Since the 1960s
Until the late 1950s, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of less than US$100 (KITA, 2010) ( Figure 1A ). However, through its rapid industrialization, which started in the 1960s and peaked in the 1980s, Korea a c h i e v e d s u b s ta n tia l economic g ro w th ( Figure 1B ). This p r o c e s s o f e c o n o m i c growth, nicknamed "Miracle on the Han River" as a reference to the historically important river that runs through South Korea, received a great deal of attention worldwide as a unique case of national development. This historical, economic, and sociological process has been extensively documented by economists such as Amsden (1989) , Balassa (1981) , Johnson (1987) , and Wade (1990) , who have studied the key drivers of Korea's economic growth. Korea's GDP per capita went from US$65 in 1955 to US$28,180 in 2014, an indication of the country's steady and rapid growth. In fact, average annual GDP growth was 9. 
Business Development: A Reflection of Growth
As of now, Korea hosts the headquarters of many competitive enterprises in the global market in the areas of IT, automobiles, shipbuilding, steel, and petrochemicals. These enterprises currently lead the growth of the Korean economy. Samsung, Hyundai, and POSCO are good examples of this.
At their inception, however, these global enterprises were small or medium-sized companies. Just to mention one example, Samsung electronics was founded in 1968 as a joint venture with Sanyo, a Japanese company. It was a small company that started manufacturing black and white screen TV sets using Japanese technology.
Another example is Hyundai, which in the early 1960s consisted only of 150 small repair shops in Korea, with five to six workers per factory. In 1967, Hyundai was established with no technology, capital, or skilled labor. The company developed and produced Korea's first indigenous car, the Hyundai Pony, in 1974.
The Role of SMEs in Korean Growth
SMEs in Korea: Supporting Large Enterprises and Economic Growth
Key to the growth of Korean economy has been the continual support of SMEs as producers of intermediate goods for large enterprises (LEs). Just to mention one example, in the car industry, 20,000 automobile parts are required to produce a single car. Currently, these parts are supplied efficiently by SMEs. It is with this input that LEs are able to produce cars quickly and manage their production more efficiently.
From a historical point of view, the Korean government noticed the need to provide SMEs the proper policy and regulatory support to increase industrial growth, using them as producers of intermediate inputs with value-added for LEs. The results show that since the end of 1970s, as a result of policy changes, the growth of manufacturing SMEs has exceeded that of large manufacturing enterprises. This was a substantial change, since in the 1960s their growth was only about a half that of large manufacturing enterprises, at a time when policy was originally aimed at promoting the growth of chemical and heavy industries, focusing on LEs.
As a result of these policy changes, with the government's active SME promotion policy designed to remedy structural imbalances stemming from the previous policy that favored LEs, 
SMEs in Korea: Pillars of the National Economy
By the end of 2012, SMEs, including manufacturing, were playing a pivotal role in the Korean economy, accounting for 99.9 percent of all enterprises and 87.7 percent of all employees (Table 1) . In terms of scale, small enterprises (SEs) take up 97.2 percent of SMEs, and their employees comprise 71.2 percent of the total number of employees that work for SMEs.
Medium-sized enterprises (MEs) and their employees make up 2.8 percent and 28.8 percent, respectively. 
SME Challenges
There are some challenges remaining for Korean SMEs, which pose obstacles for the existing SME supporting system. Some of them might look familiar to the frequent SME literature reader:
financing, human capital, markets (inbound or outbound) and research and development (R&D) (SMBA, 2014) .
According to the Bottleneck Survey for SMEs (KBIZ and KCCI, 2014) , 2 administered by KBIZ and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), the two main SME challenges in Korea are differentiated based on the size of each business: namely, R&D is the main issue
for MEs, and financing is the main challenge for SEs.
First, to sustain growth overseas, MEs must produce their own products using their own technology. But most Korean MEs are still subcontract suppliers for LEs, rather than graduating to LEs themselves. This is a consequence of bad incentives to improve their innovative capacity, and it actually prevents them from growing into highly competitive enterprises in the global marketplace.
Next, although there is liquidity in the SME financial market, SEs without collateral, such as startups and technology companies, are still suffering from financial difficulties stemming from the most recent financial crisis. In Korea, political support for start-ups is still limited. SME financial institutions and commercial banks are still reluctant to provide financing to startups due to high risk.
Although many SME policies, including financial policy, are being implemented through agencies and financial institutions, SMEs in Korea still face diverse challenges. This is connected to the continuous changes in the roles of public agencies set up by the Korean government (Oh, 2003) . They still focus on loans rather than investment, and sometimes they duplicate efforts. According to the SMBA (2014), this is due to the absence of a control tower organization to mitigate these problems according to the state of macroeconomic development and micro-level business cycles.
2 KBIZ and KCCI survey the challenges in regularly supporting and improving SME policies. When there are issues for SMEs, they administer surveys to solve the problems. KBIZ is Korea's federation of SMEs and represents their interests in Korea. KCCI was established in 1884 and is the nation's largest private economic organization. The main objective of KCCI is to promote improvement and development of Korean commerce and industry. 
SMEs Financial Support System
A Brief History and Justification of Public Policy Intervention
Korean Government SME Support System: Evolving Issues, Evolving Institutions
The Korean government began considering SMEs as targets for financial support when their role started to reflect their actual importance in the economy. The type of support has evolved over time as SMEs have changed their economic status. Specifically, in the 1960s, the government established a legal framework for assisting and fostering SMEs because the financial market was focused on LEs through export credit programs. In the 1970s and 1980s, the government protected and fostered SMEs as players in supplying and producing parts for its heavy chemical industry-driven policy. At that time, the financial market was focused on attracting foreign capital for large-scale investment.
In the 1990s, the government pursued the structural improvement of SMEs. At that time, the government decided to increase liquidity in the financial market through openness and capital market development. The government removed protective SME policies such as SMEexclusive industries and enacted structural improvement and managerial stabilization of SMEs.
After the 2000s, the government established measures to complement weak areas such as 
Cornerstone 1: The Five-year Plan
One of the key contributors to SME and economic growth was the five-year Economic Development Plan, 3 covering the period from 1962 until 1976 (KDI, 2011 . Under this plan, Korea was able to develop a competitive advantage in labor-intensive manufactured products, leading to an increase in exports, which in turn fostered economic growth. With this policy action, Korean government also wanted to bring about a change in the long-term trend of low domestic savings, and tried to attract foreign investment and end over-regulation in the private sector.
This policy increased competition and innovation among firms. Since this plan was implemented, Korea's savings rate increased from 0.8 percent in 1962 to 14 percent in 1970, and the number of manufacturing companies increased from 8,800 in 1955 to 3,331,634 in 2012. As a result, absolute poverty declined steeply, from 48 percent in 1961 to less than 10 percent at the beginning of the 1980s. 3 The plan was designed to increase wealth within Korea and strengthen political stability. It was an outward-facing and export-centric economic policy that ushered in an era of industrialization and massive technological development following a complete post-war depletion of capital stock. Korea had three five-year plans (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) under the auspices of the Economic Planning Board, a state pilot agency.
• Export credit program launch The Small and Medium Enterprises Framework Act, passed in 1966, was designed to provide statutory tools to be translated into laws to provide support, which is the constitutional spirit of SME protection. The Act is a comprehensive and fundamental statute for economic policies to safeguard SMEs. Well-framed legal support is very important in the sense that it enables the government to deliver aid to SMEs. The SME Act has been amended 13 times to respond to change in the economic climate (Annex 1).
The Act starts with the definition of SMEs themselves in order to define the subject of the policies. The most recent amendment of the SME Act ( Cornerstone 3: The SME Legal System
To sum up, since the 1960s, and taking as bases the five-year plan and the SME Act, the Korean government has implemented SME support policies that include financial and fiscal incentives as well as nonfinancial/non-fiscal incentives. To provide these incentives, the Korean government has established various agencies and systems and enacted a series of laws addressing objectives such as innovation and development, mutual support associations, value chains, and financial support ( Figure 3 ). This document will describe the latter objective in some detail, covering the creation and functions of the IBK as the largest public institution devoted to SME financing in Korea. 
Evolution of the Current Institutional Framework
Korean Government: Expanding the Frontier of SME Financing
Many countries, including Korea, cite market failures and information asymmetries as the justification for public policy intervention in SME markets. Besley (1994) found that deficiencies in the enabling environment and residual market failures, such as enforcement difficulties, imperfect information, protection of depositors, and market power, have motivated government interventions in the area of SME financing. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006) showed that the costs are especially high in the case of SMEs,
given that the information asymmetry is more severe. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) found that due to market failures, financial resources are not efficiently allocated, thus creating the need for a government role in SME financing.
The literature has documented the importance of providing access to financing and developing financial systems as a determining factor of productivity dynamics. 6 This occurs by:
(i) promoting the allocation of savings to more productive investment, improving the allocation of 6 See IDB (forthcoming [a] ). See also, Arizala, Cavallo, and Galindo (2013) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) .
Constitution (Article 123, Paragraphs 3 & 5)
Protect and foster SMEs / Foster self-help organizations dedicated to SMEs
Framework Act on SMEs
Define SMEs / Set forth SME policy directions (Dec. 6, 1966) Dec.31, 1988) factors in the economy; and (ii) enabling companies to finance investments in technologies, innovation projects, capital, and market access.
The Korean SME financial system has evolved into diverse forms in accordance with the degree of government involvement and the use of private funds to achieve policy goals. Such government policy interventions have included partial-credit guarantee schemes, direct lending facilities, and lending by state-owned financial institutions.
The Korean Way: Six Public Agencies Specializing in SME Financing
The 
Bank of Korea on SMEs: Aggregate Credit Ceilings
The Bank of Korea (BOK) was established in 1950 as Korea's central bank, with a commitment to developing the national economy through price stabilization. Since 1995, the BOK has set an aggregate credit ceiling (currently, US$10 billion) for SME loans and has provided low-interest loans within the ceiling to financial institutions in proportion to their SME loan performance based on the obligatory SME loan ratio. The obligatory SME loan ratio is a regulation that requires banks to allocate at least a certain percentage of their loan increase to SMEs. 13 If a bank fails to meet the obligatory ratio, the aggregate credit ceiling for that bank is reduced for one month by the amount equivalent to the shortfall. Financial institutions play a role on behalf of SMEs in granting indirect loans from public institutions, loans using credit guarantees, and direct loans.
Other Remaining Challenges and Side Effects
As can be deduced from the foregoing, the Korean government has provided financial support by supplying public funds directly to SMEs and by encouraging financial institutions to do so since the 1960s. Today, Korean government polices to promote SME growth receive a great deal of attention as a case of public policy intervention. However, such polices can have negative side effects. First, in terms of the demand side, evidence shows that the current policies might encourage SMEs to remain small-that is, they may choose to remain eligible for 13 The obligatory SME loan ratio is adapted according to bank type. The IBK is obligated by the IBK Act to lend more than 70 percent of its total loans to SMEs. Commercial banks are obligated by BOK regulation to lend more than 45 percent of their new loans to SMEs. OECD, 2014) . From the standpoint of the policy provider, these policies might increase public agencies' moral hazard in long-run operations. This point is reinforced by the fact of commercial banks' risk aversion to lend to small business, duplication in the support target, and policy limits of financial institutions focused on lending (Seo, 2012) .
Central government
Bank of Korea
Role of the IBK
IBK Act (1961): SMEs with Better Access to Credit through the IBK
Until the 1950s, SME support operations were carried out by diverse financial institutions, including commercial banks, the Korea Development Bank, and the Agricultural Bank. In order to reorganize the existing model and construct a more efficient financial support system for SMEs, the IBK was founded pursuant to the IBK Act of 1961. Its founding mission was to provide SMEs with better access to credit in order to promote their independent economic activities and enhance their economic position in the national economy (BOK, 2011).
The IBK Act defines the IBK's strong relationship with the government, including legal protection (Annex 3).
IBK: A Leader in SME Bank Loans
Currently, the IBK is the Korean government-based institution with the flagship role in supporting SME productive financing. Commercial banks provided 72.5 percent of total SMEs funding, whereas policy loans 14 reached 22.8 percent, and equity financing was only 1.9 percent (KBIZ, 2013) ( Figure 7 ). The SME loan-to-total-loan ratio in Korea is 41.8 percent. This proportion was higher than that of any of the OECD countries at the end of 2010.
The IBK was established as Korea's first-of-its-kind bank for SMEs and has played a leading role in providing SME funding. As mentioned above, the IBK's market share ratio of the SME financing market was 22.6 percent in 2013. It was an impressive record, compared to the number of commercial banks and local banks that provided similar funding to SMEs.
14 Policy loans in Korea consist of funding provided through SME financing institutions established by the government, such as SBC, KoFC, KCGF, KOREG, and BOK's aggregate ceiling loan. 
IBK Services
The IBK provides over 22 percent of total SME loans in terms of market share, amounting to 76.3 percent of its total loans. The IBK offers comprehensive financial services through its subsidiaries, which specialize in capital management, securities, insurance, asset management, IT systems, credit information services, and savings banking services for individuals and corporate clients. IBK business activities are growing beyond 23 direct branches in global financial hubs such as New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, China, and other Asian countries.
It has established 68,000 global networks through 14 strategic alliances with major banks. The IBK's total assets on an unconsolidated basis registered US$212 billion by the end of 2013. 
The IBK's Historical Role in the Government
How the IBK Differs from other Financial Institutions
The IBK's operational policies on SME financing are countercyclical: in general, commercial banks actively expand their loans when the economy is growing and are passive in recessions.
However, the IBK consistently supports SMEs even during recessions, supporting their role in national economy.
Second, the IBK is a policy-oriented financial institution and a distributor, so that its limited capital can be more effectively allocated. When observing the IBK's SME loans, it is clear that loans for small companies with fewer than 20 employees account for 59.9 percent of total loans at the end of 2012 (Figure 8 ).
Third, the IBK has state-of-the-art asset management and credit evaluation capability specialized in the SME financing sector. Even though the IBK has been providing high-risk loans to SMEs, it has the lowest delinquency ratio among Korean banks. 
IBK: Providing an Umbrella, Rain or Shine: Post-crisis Experience
Since private commercial banks tend to turn conservative when economic conditions tighten, they also squeeze the credit market for SMEs. However, the IBK actively sought to relieve SMEs' financial burdens while complying with government policies. During the global financial crisis (from August 2008 to December 2009), the IBK provided over half the net increase in SME loans. During the crisis, the IBK's net increase in SME loans reached US$11.6 billion; that is, 50.8 percent, more than half of the net increase in total loans of US$22.9 billion. The IBK provided more credit to SMEs than the sum of all the other banks'
credit supply in 1998 and between 2008 and 2009. Indeed, the IBK is the only bank that actually increased its credit supply during the crisis (see Table 2 and Figure 9 ). 
IBK Programs Productive Development Financing: SME Financing Schemes
The IBK offers SME funding at four different business stages and transaction coverageproduction to receivables collection. It offers not only financial but also consulting support for Korean SMEs at every stage of the business. Namely, the IBK provides both consulting and financing to startup SMEs at the startup stage. It proactively finds and incubates SMEs by providing stage financing, particularly to small manufacturing SMEs with fewer than five employees.
The next stage is the tech development stage, where the IBK provides R&D funding and preparation for commercialization, such as funding for prototype development. To do this, the IBK operates a separate division to evaluate SMEs technology and provides long-term funding of over seven years.
SMEs can get also help from the IBK in commercialization through specialized funding for purposes such as capital expenditure, including land, building, machinery and working capital.
At the globalization stage, the IBK provides resources through overseas aid funds, equity investments and IPOs, and overseas consulting, among others (Figure 10 ).
In terms of every transaction in the value chain, the IBK provides SME funding in each cash flow, from the purchase of raw materials to the collection of receivables. When the SMEs purchase raw materials, the IBK supplies working purchase capital, raw material import capital, and trade banking, both domestic and overseas.
At the production and sales stage, the IBK provides working capital, production facilities, sales facilities, and many other products for SMEs. At the sales money collection stage, the IBK is responsible for the encashment of sale credits and export bills. This scheme adapts differently according to firm size, industry, and capital use purpose, among other characteristics. The IBK is offering an optimized product for each SME through product tuning. The IBK's process analysis through these services resulted in improving their performance: SME clients who had benefited from IBK consulting services, when asked in a survey, answered that in 97.3 percent of the cases they were very satisfied. In addition, the consulting service has the effect of increasing the SMEs' productivity. Compared to other SMEs, those that received consulting services from the IBK realized about 1.5 times higher growth and profitability, as well as debt ratios that were calculated to be 0.7 times lower (Table 3) . 
Productive Development Financing: Value Chain Financing
Network Loans: Support for Weaker Enterprises
Many SMEs face cash-flow difficulties for a number of reasons, such as increasing raw material prices, exchange-rate fluctuations, and delayed payment for delivery of goods, among others.
Delayed payment for delivery of goods has been one of the main difficulties in cash flow management for Korean SMEs, as it is worldwide. As mentioned above, SMEs are intermediate good producers for LEs; thus, their cash flows depend heavily on when the latter pays for their goods and services. Furthermore, in Korea, 47 percent of SMEs were classified as subcontracting companies that supply LEs (KBIZ, 2013). These are the types of issues that network loans are designed to address.
Network Loans: Providing Capital to Suppliers as a Priority
Network loans are offered based on the purchase order issued by the buyer (commonly a LE), which repays the loan to the IBK. The flow structure of network loans is as follows: first, the IBK underwrites a business agreement for a network loan with the superior buyer (tractor enterprise), which is audited by an external agency if it holds over US$12 million in assets. This tractor enterprise must also hold a credit rating 16 of BBB or higher to sign onto this business agreement.
The buyer places the order to the supplier and transmits the order sheet to the IBK.
Then, the IBK provides the network loan to the supplier according to the terms and conditions of the business agreement. The repayment rate of the network loan usually provides up to 80 percent of the contract amounts upon delivery of goods. After that, it automatically repays the loans to the IBK when the supplier receives the delivery payment from the buyer based on the IBK's electronic payment method. To complement the collateral power of the supplier, when the buyer's management status is unstable, this system makes a network loan support agreement with guarantee agencies and jointly supports the SMEs when needed (Figure 11 ).
Network Loans: Beneficial and Evolving
Currently, the interest rate charged by the supplier is at least 1 percent lower than that of regular credit, because it is calculated based on the buyer's credit rating. For the tractor enterprise, this type of instrument will not only reduce production costs because the supplier can obtain funds at a lower cost to produce the delivery of goods; it also means more partnerships with suppliers and a better social reputation, since the buyer is identified as participating in the shared growth policy of the government.
The network loan product was launched in July 2004. Although it is very simple, evaluation has shown that it has improved SMEs cash flows, applying innovative thinking to creditworthiness between LEs, SMEs, and financial institutions (IFC, 2010) . This product can get more complex: there are a variety of advanced network loan approaches, such as public purchase loans and medical network loans, among others. It has been recognized as the most practical means of "shared growth" 17 between LEs and SMEs. At the end of 2014, 12,182 corporations were using network loan products, and the total loan balance was US$1.6 billion.
16
The IBK can take advantage of both the buyer's internal credit rating and the ratings of the credit rating agencies. 17 Shared growth, the principle according to which both large and small companies should grow together, is among the top priorities on the political agenda in Korea. There are many policy instruments to promote shared or mutual growth of LEs and SMEs, and the Korea Fair Trade Commission has played a pivotal role. 
Win-win Collaboration Loans: Capital to Cooperative SMEs Recommended by LEs using Interest Income from LE Deposits
The impact of the global financial crisis created social consensus around shared growth; thus, value chain finance gained further attention with regard to SME financing. This was also the case with network loans. Considering this situation, the win-win collaboration loan concept was developed to provide loans to superior cooperative SMEs using the financial resources of LEs deposited in public institutions.
The structure of a win-win collaboration loan is as follows: the IBK underwrites a business agreement with LEs or public institutions, which deposit their flows in the IBK ( Figure   12 ). LEs deposit these funds without receiving interest from the IBK, which in turn takes advantage of these zero-interest loans to support cooperative SMEs: LEs can support cooperative SMEs while maintaining deposits. When SMEs apply for the LE capital, LEs recommend the cooperative SMEs to the IBK as targets for support. The IBK executes the winwin collaboration loan to offer these resources at a low interest rate. It is important to mention that guarantee agencies may deliver support for these types of SME loans if necessary. 
LEs and Cooperative SMEs: Significant Benefits of Joining the Win-win Collaboration Loan
As explained above, the interest on win-win collaboration loans is lower than that on regular credits because SMEs use the interest income from LEs deposits, almost in a cross-subsidy fashion. The loan interest rate depends on the cooperative SMEs' credit rating, as recommended by LEs. In order to receive the full credit loan from the IBK, an SME must hold a credit rating of BB+ or more according to the IBK's criteria. In turn, LEs receive significant benefits for taking part in a win-win collaboration: they improve partnerships with the cooperative SMEs, improve their reputation, and use it to enhance the company's image. 
Expansion of a Shared Growth Financial Product
This product, launched in November 2008, had been used in 6,582 cases as of the end of 2014, with a total loan balance of US$3.5 billion. These win-win collaboration loans have ensured consistency in supply chains for 90 renowned participating LEs, such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai/Kia Motors, and POSCO. More recently, not only LEs but also middle-tier firms have been participating in the collaboration funds. Win-win collaboration funds not only validate LEs' contribution to society; they also facilitate capital flows between SMEs and serve as a riskmanagement option for the bank.
Risk Management
IBK SME High-risk Loans with the Lowest Delinquency Ratio in Korean Banks
The three stages of the IBK risk-management process can be categorized by implementation in the same order of the loan; that is, the pre-lending assessment stage, the interim review stage, and the aftercare stage. The pre-lending assessment stage is a decision-making stage before the loan is issued. The main systems are composed of the pool of credit officers, the loan approval, and the credit limit decision. Next is the interim review stage, which is executed after issuing the loans. It is largely divided into manual checks executed directly by the loan officer and systematic checks filtered by various systems. The final stage of risk management takes place at the aftercare stage. This process in mainly targeted at businesses with potential insolvency concerns in the interim review process explained above. When SMEs with IBK loans face liquidity crises due to declining sales, bankruptcy of a trading company, or a collection delay, among others, they are more likely to be designated as high risk in the corporate credit assessment (Table 4) .
As a whole, the risk management process contributes to the IBK's low delinquency ratio.
It wa s lower than the market average by 0.3 to 0.5 percent in 2012 (Table 5) . Observing the delinquency ratio on IBK products, more interesting results can be seen. This low delinquency ratio shows the value-added to each chain by the IBK's financial products. For example, the delinquency ratio differential of 1.05 percent from win-win collaboration loans is significantly lower than the total SME loan delinquency rate. 
The Credit-rating Model and the Early Warning System
Unlike commercial banks in Korea, using a common credit-rating model for LEs and SMEs, the IBK uses a specialized system for SMEs. In 1995, the IBK developed its own SME credit-rating model, the first of its kind in Korea. The credit-rating model is a combination of the IBK's extensive database on 180,000 SMEs and IBK credit officers' know-how. The IBK's corporate credit-rating model is classified into six types, depending on total assets and total exposure, among other factors.
The early warning system automatically checks for credit risk of the company, using automated techniques, on a daily basis. The credit monitoring system checks for the appropriateness of the current credit rating and, if an issue occurs that affects it, it is adjusted after considering the results. The possibilities of a change in the client's credit risk due to financial and trading situations are regularly monitored through the early warning system at each classification stage. 18 The early warning companies are intensively managed.
SMEs and Growth: LAC and Korea
LAC and Korea
As is evident from the previous analysis, Korea and the LAC region have taken different paths in terms of development and growth. One of the main reasons for this is the different approaches that governments have taken in the LAC region, which are not convergent and have varied over time with changes in government. This document extracts some lessons from the Korean experience for LAC governments to implement ideas for their development banks and SME networks to complement the current policies.
SME Size
Despite the differences in growth rates between Korea and LAC countries, there are some interesting insights from the Korean experience that may be relevant for LAC countries with regard to promoting SMEs and private sector development. Given SMEs' share in terms of both number of firms and number of employees, they are critical players for productive development in both Korea and Latin America. However, while Korean SMEs contribute as much as 60 percent to the country's GDP as a result of encouragement by the Korean government, among other historical and technological reasons, in Latin America, SMEs contribute only 30 percent to GDP. This gap shows that SMEs in Latin America are less productive than SMEs in Korea, thus contributing less to GDP and GDP growth. While this subject certainly deserves more attention, this section will focus on the policy actions undertaken by Korean administrations to support
SMEs.
Long-term Government Support in Korea
In Korea, SMEs have received strong support from public policy for the past five decades, regardless of changes in government and economic policies. Indeed, SMEs in Korea have been supported by decisions such as long-term policies, plans, and laws. It is of particular interest that support to Korean SMEs was conceived in the context of improving the competitiveness of the Korean economy as a whole. In this context, public policy stressed that in order to achieve competitiveness for LEs, it was critical to improve the competitiveness of their SME suppliers.
Therefore, directing public support to SMEs was important not only because of SMEs' role in employment, but also their role in a connected, networked economy, where the productivity of large Korean enterprises depended on the performance of a large number of smaller suppliers.
Lack of Access to Financing
Lack of access to financing was identified as a key barrier for Korean SMEs to grow and improve their performance. Hence, different agencies put in place a number of financial and nonfinancial instruments. Among these are credit funds, guarantee funds, and technical assistance. Public support is provided through different institutions, which include public banks, ministries, and a vast array of agencies. In recent years, efforts have been directed to enhancing coordination among public programs to avoid overlapping and dispersion of public resources. Among financial instruments, guarantee funds play a critical role in increasing access to financing for SMEs. Information asymmetries and lack of collateral usually increase the cost of lending and reduce the incentives for commercial banks to finance SMEs. Credit guarantees provided by public funds as collateral of funds lent to SMEs by commercial banks have proven to be an important incentive to enhance access to financing for SMEs.
Risk Management Systems
The IBK, among some other institutions within the Korean SME financing system, has developed and tested strong risk management systems, which are an important basis not only for delivering credit but also for measuring and understanding SMEs. Risk measurement allows the IBK and other institutions to deliver loans securely, whether they are acting as second-tier banks or lending directly to borrowers. LAC countries' development banks are frequently overseen by regulators and supervisors and must comply with local regulations for risk management. Also, it is common to find these banks serving as second-tier banks, and there are often exemptions for such banks in terms of risk management. In the end, the final borrowers are those who generate impact with the actions of development banks. Whether they are second-tier banks or not, starting with proper measurements, development banks must implement risk management. This practice should not be restricted to first-tier banks, but should be applied to final beneficiaries.
Enterprise Surveys
One of the most relevant activities described above was the fact that the Korean government surveys enterprises to gather data on their size, shape and type of organization, risks, among other relevant data. This sort of measurement allows policymakers not only to correctly describe and classify SMEs but also to understand their needs, enabling them to adopt policies which actually solve their problems Furthermore, surveys shed light on managerial issues such as the aforementioned Peter Pan syndrome. LAC countries should invest some money and time in such surveys to properly focus policy actions and obtain relevant data, among other benefits.
Institutional Capacity
Strong institutional capacity is also an important characteristic of the Korean experience. Among these institutions is the IBK, which through different instruments provides integrated support to SMEs in all phases of their business. The ability to combine financial and nonfinancial instruments allows the IBK to be an important partner for SMEs willing to grow and become members of domestic and international supply chains. The IBK provides funding to address different needs of SMEs, including financing, R&D, technological improvements, and overseas expansion, and provides innovative instruments to enhance supply-chain performance and collaboration. As the IDB's experience has recently shown, the results of access to financing for the productive sector are increased if development banks go beyond pure financing and complement their efforts with training and, again, measuring results (IDB, forthcoming[b] ). This means that institutional capacity must be created for development banks within the region, and laws must be changed for them to fulfill this responsibility.
Supply Chain Performance
Related to this instrument, a critical characteristic of the Korean experience is close collaboration between the public and private sectors. Indeed, the role of LEs is relevant for instruments such as network loans and win-win collaboration loans to succeed in their purpose of enhancing both SME access to finance and access to markets by becoming suppliers of LEs.
Some Key Lessons
Based on the distinctive characteristics of the Korean experience in supporting SMEs, some key lessons for Latin American countries that merit further analysis are the following:
• A long-term policy aimed at supporting SMEs is needed not only because of their role in employment, but also because of their role in a connected, networked economy where SMEs are key suppliers of larger firms and where competitiveness depends on the performance of both the larger firm and its suppliers.
• A strong institutional environment that promotes access to financing for SMEs through different instruments throughout the different business phases of a firm is essential.
• Innovative products that address the needs of the private sector (such as overseas financing and network loans) are needed.
• Close collaboration between the private and the public sectors that allows the latter to identify and better address the needs and actions to support private sector growth is key.
Conclusions
The contribution of SMEs to the rapid growth of Korea's economic was greater than that of LEs.
The Korean government positively intervened in setting up SMEs' legal framework and building the SME financial infrastructure through loans and guarantee agencies. In particular, it performed a countercyclical role and managed risk through a variety of products developed to meet SMEs' needs by establishing the IBK, a state-owned bank. The most important factor for Korean SME growth is a harmonious role and operation of these financial institutions for SMEs under the SME legal system, rather than one institution. However, to support sustainable growth The government made over a half of the capital investment mandatory to permit the issuance of SME financial bond Third March 7, 1968 To abolish the restrictions on the income from current accounts Fourth March 5, 1973 To form the board of directors December 22, 1975 To require losses to be replenished by the government Sixth December 28, 1979 To form special provisions for SME transactions Seventh December 31, 1980 To make legally mandatory to conduct research and corporate guidance for SMEs; to differentiate the reserves ratio from other financial institutions Eighth December 31, 1991
Fifth
To abolish investor restrictions (confined to the government and SME entrepreneurs); to require shareholders' meetings Tenth August 28, 1997 To abolish the government's obligation of mandatory capital investment; to expand the issuance limit of SME financial bonds Thirteenth May 24, 1999 To set the rationale for supervising the soundness of the Financial Supervisory Commission Fourteenth December 11, 2003 To deregulate, including abolishment of the permit and approval of the guardian minister 
